198 ideas
22396 | We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot] |
22496 | Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot] |
22397 | Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot] |
15209 | Like disastrous small errors in navigation, small misunderstandings can wreck intellectual life [Harré/Madden] |
15215 | Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden] |
15212 | Analysis of concepts based neither on formalism nor psychology can arise from examining what we know [Harré/Madden] |
15210 | Humeans see analysis in terms of formal logic, because necessities are fundamentally logical relations [Harré/Madden] |
15236 | Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden] |
15227 | Logically, definitions have a subject, and a set of necessary predicates [Harré/Madden] |
22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
15273 | Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden] |
15274 | Points are 'continuous' if any 'cut' point participates in both halves of the cut [Harré/Madden] |
15211 | There is not an exclusive dichotomy between the formal and the logical [Harré/Madden] |
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
15318 | Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden] |
15267 | Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
15279 | Energy was introduced to physics to refer to the 'store of potency' of a moving ball [Harré/Madden] |
15276 | Some powers need a stimulus, but others are just released [Harré/Madden] |
15305 | Some powers are variable, others cannot change (without destroying an identity) [Harré/Madden] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
15258 | Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden] |
15315 | What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden] |
15272 | The good criticism of substance by Humeans also loses them the vital concept of a thing [Harré/Madden] |
15304 | We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden] |
15309 | The assumption that shape and solidity are fundamental implies dubious 'substance' in bodies [Harré/Madden] |
15264 | The notorious substratum results from substance-with-qualities; individuals-with-powers solves this [Harré/Madden] |
15262 | In logic the nature of a kind, substance or individual is the essence which is inseparable from what it is [Harré/Madden] |
15297 | We can infer a new property of a thing from its other properties, via its essential nature [Harré/Madden] |
15266 | We say the essence of particles is energy, but only so we can tell a story about the nature of things [Harré/Madden] |
15220 | To say something remains the same but lacks its capacities and powers seems a contradiction [Harré/Madden] |
15222 | Some individuals can gain or lose capacities or powers, without losing their identity [Harré/Madden] |
15296 | A particular might change all of its characteristics, retaining mere numerical identity [Harré/Madden] |
15275 | 'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time [Harré/Madden] |
15271 | If things are successive instantaneous events, nothing requires those events to resemble one another [Harré/Madden] |
15256 | Humeans cannot step in the same river twice, because they cannot strictly form the concept of 'river' [Harré/Madden] |
15290 | What reduces the field of the possible is a step towards necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15291 | There is 'absolute' necessity (implied by all propositions) and 'relative' necessity (from what is given) [Harré/Madden] |
15230 | Logical necessity is grounded in the logical form of a statement [Harré/Madden] |
15221 | The relation between what a thing is and what it can do or undergo relate by natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15214 | Natural necessity is not logical necessity or empirical contingency in disguise [Harré/Madden] |
15224 | A necessity corresponds to the nature of the actual [Harré/Madden] |
15232 | Natural necessity is when powerful particulars must produce certain results in a situation [Harré/Madden] |
15288 | People doubt science because if it isn't logically necessary it seems to be absolutely contingent [Harré/Madden] |
15289 | Property or event relations are naturally necessary if generated by essential mechanisms [Harré/Madden] |
15231 | Transcendental necessity is conditions of a world required for a rational being to know its nature [Harré/Madden] |
15234 | There is a transcendental necessity for each logical necessity, but the transcendental extends further [Harré/Madden] |
15260 | Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden] |
15233 | If natural necessity is used to include or exclude some predicate, the predicate is conceptually necessary [Harré/Madden] |
15242 | Having a child is contingent for a 'man', necessary for a 'father'; the latter reflects a necessity of nature [Harré/Madden] |
15216 | Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden] |
15235 | There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden] |
15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
15252 | If Goldbach's Conjecture is true (and logically necessary), we may be able to conceive its opposite [Harré/Madden] |
15245 | It is silly to say that direct experience must be justified, either by reason, or by more experience [Harré/Madden] |
15244 | We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden] |
22449 | When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot] |
15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
15269 | Humean impressions are too instantaneous and simple to have structure or relations [Harré/Madden] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
15298 | We prefer the theory which explains and predicts the powers and capacities of particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15225 | Science investigates the nature and constitution of things or substances [Harré/Madden] |
15255 | Conjunctions explain nothing, and so do not give a reason for confidence in inductions [Harré/Madden] |
15270 | Hume's atomic events makes properties independent, and leads to problems with induction [Harré/Madden] |
15284 | Contraposition may be equivalent in truth, but not true in nature, because of irrelevant predicates [Harré/Madden] |
15285 | The items put forward by the contraposition belong within different natural clusters [Harré/Madden] |
15287 | The possibility that all ravens are black is a law depends on a mechanism producing the blackness [Harré/Madden] |
15306 | Only changes require explanation [Harré/Madden] |
15293 | If explanation is by entailment, that lacks a causal direction, unlike natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15294 | Powers can explain the direction of causality, and make it a natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
15310 | Solidity comes from the power of repulsion, and shape from the power of attraction [Harré/Madden] |
15219 | Essence explains passive capacities as well as active powers [Harré/Madden] |
15301 | The very concepts of a particular power or nature imply the possibility of being generalised [Harré/Madden] |
22371 | Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot] |
23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
15226 | What properties a thing must have to be a type of substance can be laid down a priori [Harré/Madden] |
15229 | We say there is 'no alternative' in all sorts of contexts, and there are many different grounds for it [Harré/Madden] |
23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
22480 | Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot] |
23694 | All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot] |
22372 | Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot] |
22393 | I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
22481 | There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG] |
22482 | I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot] |
22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
4692 | It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot] |
4694 | Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot] |
22445 | Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot] |
22444 | A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot] |
23683 | Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
22451 | All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot] |
22485 | Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot] |
22474 | Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot] |
23684 | Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23690 | We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
23686 | Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23693 | Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot] |
23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
23687 | Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
22375 | Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot] |
22493 | Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot] |
22492 | Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot] |
22377 | Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot] |
22378 | We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot] |
22487 | Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot] |
22376 | Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot] |
22491 | Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot] |
23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
22447 | Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot] |
22452 | Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot] |
23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |
22381 | Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot] |
22379 | The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot] |
22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
22497 | Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot] |
22498 | Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot] |
23695 | Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot] |
22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
22499 | We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot] |
22402 | Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot] |
23145 | Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver] |
22401 | Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot] |
22398 | Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot] |
22478 | The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot] |
23692 | Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot] |
22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
22373 | People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot] |
22495 | Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot] |
22456 | Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot] |
22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |
22403 | Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot] |
22472 | The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot] |
22479 | Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot] |
22400 | Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot] |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |
22395 | Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot] |
22448 | We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot] |
22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
22502 | Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot] |
4693 | The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
22446 | In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot] |
22380 | Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot] |
15292 | We can base the idea of a natural kind on the mechanisms that produce natural necessity [Harré/Madden] |
15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
15253 | If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden] |
15278 | Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden] |
15246 | Active causal power is just objects at work, not something existing in itself [Harré/Madden] |
15213 | Causation always involves particular productive things [Harré/Madden] |
15217 | Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden] |
15277 | The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden] |
15237 | Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden] |
15238 | Being lawlike seems to resist formal analysis, because there are always counter-examples [Harré/Madden] |
15223 | Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden] |
15241 | Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden] |
15240 | In lawful universal statements (unlike accidental ones) we see why the regularity holds [Harré/Madden] |
15239 | We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden] |
15243 | We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions [Harré/Madden] |
15280 | 'Kinetic energy' is used to explain the effects of moving things when they are stopped [Harré/Madden] |
15265 | 'Energy' is a quasi-substance invented as the bearer of change during interactions [Harré/Madden] |
15321 | Space can't be an individual (in space), but it is present in all places [Harré/Madden] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
15263 | Chemistry is not purely structural; CO2 is not the same as SO2 [Harré/Madden] |
15259 | Chemical atoms have two powers: to enter certain combinations, and to emit a particular spectrum [Harré/Madden] |
15295 | Theism is supposed to make the world more intelligible - and should offer results [Harré/Madden] |